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Festo to the Rescue?
The Return of the Warner-Jenkinson
Standard and a Preemptive Solution for
the Future of the Patent Law Balance
BY R. FLYNT STREAN*
INTRODUCTION
t is a theme that pervades intellectual property law: the balance
between protecting rights and providing information.' In the patent
realm, one side of the balance provides the patent owner with the ability to
exclude others from making, using, or selling a patented invention.2 The
other side of the balance provides the public with detailed information that
describes the invention.' Patenting serves as an incentive for an inventor to
"J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky.
'See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski, in his dissent, summarizes the
balance as it applies to many facets of intellectual property:
This is why intellectual property law is full of careful balances between
what's set aside for the owner and what's left in the public domain for the
rest of us: The relatively short life of patents; the longer, but finite, life of
copyrights; copyright's idea-expression dichotomy; the fair use doctrine; the
prohibition on copyrighting facts; the compulsory license of television
broadcasts and musical compositions; federal preemption of overbroad state
intellectual property laws; the nominative use doctrine in trademark law; the
right to make soundalike recordings. All of these diminish an intellectual
property owner's rights. All let the public use something created by
someone else. But all are necessary to maintain a free environment in which
creative genius can flourish.
Id.
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2002). The power to exclude is implicit in the power
to bring a patent infringement action. Id. ("Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
3 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-113 (2002). Section 111 describes the general elements
of a patent application, which include a specification as described in section 112
and a drawing as described in Section 113. These details are also included in the
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protect his or her idea from exploitation by others, but it also enlightens the
public with novel information. If an inventor wishes not to patent his or her
invention, the alternatives could result in substantial economic risk. The
effect on the public is even more certain since the information will not be
available to further the wealth of collective technical knowledge.
Patenting an invention, however, will not guarantee certain wealth;
there is also no guarantee that an aggressive competitor will not enter the
market. The extent of protection under a patent is based on the interpreta-
tion of the internal technical descriptions of the patent. These are somewhat
like the technical descriptions that designate the location and boundaries of
a tract of land. However, because patent descriptions are interpreted, the
boundaries become malleable. Therefore, competitors may search for weak
areas of the boundary in order to circumvent the presumed protection of the
patent and compete in the market.
In determining the meaning of these boundaries, courts apply two
balancing doctrines. One gives more protection to a patent owner than he
or she literally claimed--effectively allowing the property boundary to
bulge out. The other removes protection that could exist-effectively
pushing the boundary inward. These doctrines, recently reviewed by the
Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
are "the doctrine of equivalents" and "prosecution history estoppel,"
respectively.4
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the patent law system
and describes some key concepts considered by the Supreme Court in
Festo. In particular, descriptions of the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel are given.' Part II of the Note focuses on the
law as it existed prior to Festo, and as it was described in Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.6 Parts III and IV of the Note
examine the Festo decision in light of the Warner-Jenkinson standard and
explore the effect of the changes to the patent process that were proposed
in the case.7 Finally, in Part V, the Note introduces a novel suggestion to
restoring balance to the patent law system in the form of a new designation
that could be added to the current patent law prosecution system.'
patent once issued and serve as a disclosure of the details of the invention to the
public.
" See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722
(2002).
See infra notes 9-39 and accompanying text.
6 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see
also infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 61-109 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes I 10-14 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Overall Goals of Intellectual Property Protection
The authority given to Congress to promote patent protection is
received directly from Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution.9 This power, upon which many industries and economies have
been built,"° is implemented in Title 35 of the United States Code,
otherwise known as the Patent Act. 1 In general, the owner of a patent is
granted a limited monopoly for a useful, novel, and non-obvious
invention. 2 The monopoly allows the inventor, if he or she is lucky, to reap
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
'0 See ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO
PROFITING FROM PATENT PORTFOLIOS 2 (2000). The author includes the following
discussion regarding the effect of patent portfolios on business:
IBM's patent and intellectual property licensing efforts generate more than
a billion dollars in revenue annually. Nicholas Donofrio, IBM's senior vice
president and group executive of corporate technology and manufacturing,
credits IBM's patent portfolio with a role in the successful generation of
more than $30 billion worth of OEM agreements signed by IBM's
Technology Group in 1999. Recently acquired companies such as WebTV
and Amati Communications each commanded substantial purchase prices,
rumored to be due in large part to their substantial patent portfolios....
However, a lack of attention to patentshave caused companies problems.
For example, in 1993, Eastman Kodak terminated one of its imaging
technology subsidiaries after Wang Technologies, Inc. brought a patent
infringement suit against the subsidiary.
Id.
"Specifically, the Patent Act is contained in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2002).
12 See id. §§ 101, 103. The useful and novel requirements are described in
Section 101, which explains the patentability of inventions: "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. § 101. The non-
obviousness requirement is discussed in Section 103, which states in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art




the rewards of his or her patented invention to the exclusion of everyone
else. 3 The term of the patent limits the monopoly. 4 When the term expires,
the invention becomes part of the public domain, at which point "the patent
laws create a federal right to copy and use."15
In patent law, the pervasive goal is balancing the property rights of the
patent owner with the need for public access to the information describing
the patented material. 6 Maintaining this balance is instrumental to
furthering the constitutional mandate, and therefore the limits of the rights
assumed by a patent must be as clear as possible. 7
The territorial limits established by a patent are defined in its claims. 8
The claims are the heart of a patent, and consequently they attract the bulk
" See id. § 271. Section 271 actually describes at length the infringement of
patents, however the implication of the ability to levy a cause of action for
infringement is what constitutes the value of a patent.
14 See id. § 154(a)(2). This section provides:
Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for a term
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United
States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed
application or applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title,
from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.
Id.
15 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 5 (5th ed. 2001).
16 See, e.g., Pfaffv. Wells Elec., Inc. 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). Justice Stevens
explained the balance in patent law:
[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages
both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time. The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one
hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle
competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws since
their inception.
Id.
" See HARMON, supra note 15, at 11. See also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead
Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that "[i]nherent in our
claim-based patent system is also the principle that the protected invention is what
the claims say it is, and thus that infringement can be avoided by avoiding the
language of the claims").
"s See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002). Regarding specifications, this section states in
part: "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention." Id.
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of patent litigation:' 9 "Thus, the scope of a patent's claims determines what
infringes the patent, and the sole effect of the grant of the property right to
exclude others for a limited time from unauthorized use of a patented
invention is to require that others avoid the claimed structure or process. 20
The claims that ultimately find their way into an issued patent, however,
are rarely unmodified from their orginal form. Amendments and other give-
and-take between a patent applicant and the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") are very common.2'
Patent infringement is covered in § 271(a) of Title 35 of the United
States Code.22 This section explicitly recognizes literal infringement of a
claim, 23 which "occurs when every limitation recited in the claim appears
in the accused device., 24 Although this is sufficient to protect a patent
owner from those unimaginative opportunists who attempt to cash in
simply by duplicating an invention, the scope of protection does not stop
with literal infringement.
B. Key Concepts of Patent Prosecution
1. Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution History Estoppel
The doctrine of equivalents is judge-made law.25 It stipulates that "a
product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of
a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is 'equiva-
lence' between the elements of the accused product or process and the
claimed elements of the patented invention.,,26 The doctrine of equivalents
requires analysis on an element by element basis.27 If the differences
between an element of the accused product and the patented product
'9 See SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 263 (1999).
20 HARMON, supra note 15, at 10.
21See, e.g., Transcript from Oral Arguments before Supreme Court, Festo Corp.
v. Skoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 16-17 (Jan. 8, 2002), at http://a257.g.
akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/30jan20021630/www.supremecourtus.gov/oraLargu
ments/argumenttranscripts/00- 1543.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
22 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2002).
23 See HALPERN ET AL., supra note 19, at 263-65.
24 DeMarini Sports v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
25 See HARMON, supra note 15, at 331.
26 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)
(citation omitted).
27 See HARMON, supra note 15, at 333.
2002-2003]
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are "insubstantial," the products are deemed equivalent.28 Differences
between elements29 are considered insubstantial "'if [they] perform[ ]
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result.' 3 0 The rationale for the doctrine is based on the concern that
a device would be protected only by the exact and specific words used in
the claims and that others would then have an incentive to make insubstan-
tial changes, aiming only to bring a "copy" of the device outside the literal
protection of the claims.3' At first glance, this doctrine may appear to
severely tilt the property rights versus public access balance in favor of the
patent owner. However, the doctrine of equivalents has, as its limiting
doctrine, prosecution history estoppel.
Prosecution history estoppel (sometimes referred to as "file wrapper
estoppel"),32 establishes that a patent holder should not be able to claim
protective territory that was surrendered during the patent application
process (otherwise known as 'patent prosecution').33 Prosecution history
estoppel "limits a patentee's reliance upon the [doctrine of equivalents] by
preventing it from contending later that its claims should be interpreted as
if limitations added by amendment were not present or that claims
abandoned are still present."'3 4 Therefore, prosecution history estoppel is a
defense to a patent infringement charge.35
The efficacy of the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history
estoppel was recently reviewed by the Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.36 Although some pundits have
28 Catalina Marketing Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 812
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
29 A definition of "element" in the patent claim sense can be found in Coming
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric USA, Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
1989). There, the court states:
"Element" maybe used to mean a single limitation, but it has been used to
mean a series of limitations which, taken together, make up a component of
the claimed invention. In the All Elements rule, "element" is used in the
sense of a limitation of a claim.
Id. (citations omitted).
30 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
31 See Graver, 339 U.S. at 607.
32 See, e.g., HARMON, supra note 15, at 362.
31 See id. at 361-65. See also HALPERN ET AL., supra note 19, at 267.
34 See HARMON, supra note 15, at 363.
31 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
(1997).36Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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concluded that this decision changed the landscape of patent prosecution,
37
the Supreme Court is generally reluctant to make changes to patent law that
will have major economic effects.3" A better interpretation of the decision
is that it simply reinforced the application of the doctrine of equivalents set
out in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical CO.
39
II. THE WARNER-JENKINSON DECISION
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. ("Warner") and Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
("Hilton") were both involved in manufacturing color dyes."' Included in
its patent portfolio, Hilton owned U.S. Patent No. 4,560,746 ("the '746
patent"), which was issued in 1985.4 ' A critical claim in the '746 patent
describes an improved filtration process "'through a membrane having
a nominal pore diameter of 5-15 Angstroms under a hydrostatic pressure
of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., at a pH from approximately 6.0 to
9.0.' ,42 This critical phrase was added to a claim during prosecution, after
the PTO expressed concern with an existing patent that described a process
using a pH above 9.0.43 No reason was given for the lower pH limit of 6.0.
4
In 1986, apparently unaware of the '746 patent, Warner developed a similar
filtration process that operated at a, pH level of 5.0."5 Once aware of
Warner's process, Hilton filed a patent infringement suit that eventually
reached the Supreme Court.46
37 See IP World Wide, Festo Feast (July 2002), at http://www.jaffeassociates.
com/JaffeNews/020701 .html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003); IPMatters: Supreme Court
Confirms Change in US Patent Landscape (Aug. 2002), at http://www.derwent.
com/ipmatters/features/festo.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003); Womble Carlyle
Patent Law Update, Michael A. Cicero, Supreme Court Decides Festo: Ability to
Access Claim-Expanding Doctrine Restored (June 11, 2002), at http://www.
commlaw.com/FSL5CS/news%20bites/news%20bitesl303.asp (last visited Apr.
4, 2003). But see Steven J. Frank et al., Festo, Schmesto! (Mar. 5, 2003), at http://
www.spectrum.ieee.org/careers/careerstemplate.jsp?ArticleId=iO7O4O2 (last visited
Apr. 4, 2003).
" See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
31 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 21.
4 id.
41 Id. at 21-22.
421 d. at 22 (citing the '746 Patent Application at 36-37).
43 Id. (the existing patent was the "Booth" patent).
44Id. at 22 n.2.




Hilton based its claim on the doctrine of equivalents, and Warner in
turn challenged the doctrine's validity." Warner first argued to extinguish
the doctrine based on a belief that it was inconsistent with the Patent Act.48
The Court refused to overrule the doctrine of equivalents, stating that "the
lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents strongly supports adherence
to our refusal... to find that the Patent Act conflicts with that doctrine."4 9
However, in response to concerns that a broad application of the doctrine
could result in boundless claims, the Court stated that the doctrine shall be
applied on an element by element basis as opposed to viewing the patent as
whole.50
Anticipating a refusal from the Court to kill the doctrine, Hilton argued
in the alternative for several limitations in the doctrine's application: (1)
that prosecution history estoppel should be applied liberally; (2) that intent
should be required; and (3) that the doctrine should only apply to disclosed
equivalents.5
A. The Scope of Prosecution History Estoppel
Hilton suggested that "any surrender of subject matter during patent
prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surrender, precludes
recapturing any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the
matter expressly claimed."52 The Court rejected this application and
indicated that previous cases had only considered prosecution history
estoppel when limiting changes were made "to avoid the prior art, or [ ] to
address a specific concern . . . that arguably would have rendered the
claimed subject matter unpatentable. 53 For a limiting change such as the
one present in this case,54 where no indication was given as to why the
change was made, the Court created a presumption that the change was
made in order to avoid unpatentability. The burden was then on the patent
4 1 Id. at 23, 25.
4 1 Id. at 25.
491Id. at 28.
50Id. at 28-29.
51Id. at 30, 34, 37.52 Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 30-31.54 The patentees modified the high end of the range, 9.0, in response to the PTO
prosecution, however there was no agreement as to why they limited the lower end
of the range to 6.0. Id at 22.
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holder to overcome the presumption." This has since been referred to as the
rebuttable presumption.56
B. Is Intent Required?
Hilton next argued that, because one of the objectives of the doctrine
of equivalents is to stifle those who make insubstantial changes to a
patented design in order to copy it without literally infringing, an element
of intent must be present. 7 Again, the Court was reluctant to impose such
a limitation on the doctrine, stating that "there is no basis for treating an
infringing equivalent any differently from a device that infringes the
express terms of the patent .... [T]herefore, [it] is akin to determining
literal infringement, and neither requires proof of intent."58
C. The Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents
Hilton last argued that notice of the scope of the patent's protective
territory necessitated that equivalents be disclosed in the patent.59 In other
words, Hilton wished only to apply the doctrine of equivalents to those
equivalents that were not only known at the time of the patent but that were
actually recited within the patent. Once again, the Court refused to limit the
doctrine in this way. "[T]he proper time for evaluating equivalency- and
thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements--is at the time of
infringement, not at the time the patent was issued."' Thus, the Court
implied that the doctrine of equivalents may be applied to amended claims
if an equivalent of the claim was not known at the time of the drafting of
the claim.
With the Warner-Jenkinson decision, the Supreme Court accomplished
several important things. It reaffirmed the long-standing validity of the
doctrine of equivalents and provided a presumption against the application
of the doctrine for unexplained limitations, while also limiting the
application of prosecution history estoppel. More than five years later, the
SI Id. at 33.
56 Id. at 41-42. Although implicit from the text of the majority's opinion, Justice
Thomas does not use the phrase "rebuttable presumption." Justice Ginsburg,
however, does use the phrase in her concurrence. Id.
17 See id. at 34.
" Id. at 35.




Supreme Court would once again be faced with a challenge to the
application of the doctrine of equivalents, and like Warner-Jenkinson, it
came in the form of a demand for broad application of prosecution history
estoppel.
III. THE FESTO DECISION
The facts of the Festo case closely parallel those of Warner-Jenkinson.
In Festo, the patent owner developed a method to move objects along a
conveying system and held two related patents, known as the "Stoll" patent
and the "Carroll" patent.6' The patents covered a device that utilized
magnetic properties to transport objects along a conveyance path.62 During
prosecution of both of these applications, amendments were made to the
claims in response to actions from the PTO. Both patents added the
limitation that the system would contain two one-way sealing rings, each
with a one-way sealing lip.63 The Stoll patent was further amended to
indicate that the outer sleeve of the design would be made of a magnetic
material.'
After introduction of Festo's device into the market, Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., a.k.a. SMC Corporation ("SMC"), introduced a
product that was very similar.65 SMC's device had two differences: it
contained a single sealing ring "with a two-way lip" and the material
chosen for the sleeve was nonmagnetizable.66 Festo filed an infringement
action claiming that the SMC device infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents.
The Festo case was volleyed back and forth through the federal court
system. The original action occurred before the 1997 Warner-Jenkinson
decision, and by the time the Supreme Court first granted certiorari in 1998,
the Court remanded the case in light of the Warner-Jenkinson decision. 7
6' Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831,
1835-36 (2002). When it is released, the U.S. Reporter cite for this case will be 535
U.S. 722 (2002). The U.S. Reporter cite is not used in this footnote and those
following because pagination is not available as of the date of publication.
621Id. at 1835.




671 Id. The original case was heard in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, which held in favor of Festo and denied the claim of
estoppel. From there, the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
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In 2001, the Supreme Court once again granted certiorari to clear up what
had apparently become a confused understanding of the Warner-Jenkinson
standard.68
In the case under review, the Federal Court of Appeals had changed
both the scope of application of prosecution history estoppel and its effect
on the doctrine of equivalents when it held: (1) that prosecution history
estoppel should apply to "any amendment that narrows a claim to comply
with the Patent Act;" and (2) that prosecution history estoppel should act
as an absolute bar to use of the doctrine of equivalents.69 The court
rationalized this holding by claiming that it "lends certainty to the process
of determining the scope of protection afforded by a patent."70 Nearly the
same arguments were originally heard in front of the Supreme Court in
Warner-Jenkinson just five years earlier.7
After a chronological recounting of the history for the rules applicable
to the case and before applying those rules to the facts, the Court reminded
the appeals court of its decision in Warner-Jenkinson and once again
quoted:
Circuit where the District Court's ruling was affirmed. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and then vacated and remanded in light of its Warner-Jenkinson
decision. The original panel heard the case on remand and the Court of Appeals
ordered a rehearing en banc. The en banc court reversed the decision, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. (citations omitted).
68 d. at 1835. The ruling handed down by the en banc court spanned over eighty
pages and included seven separate opinions. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded by
122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
69 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1836 (emphasis added).
70Festo, 234 F.3d at 577.
71 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-26
(1997). The court summarizes the arguments in that case as follows:
In particular, petitioner argues: (1) The doctrine of equivalents is inconsis-
tent with the statutory requirement that a patentee specifically "claim" the
invention covered by a patent; (2) the doctrine circumvents the patent
reissue process-designed to correct mistakes in drafting or the like--and
avoids the express limitations on that process; (3) the doctrine is inconsis-
tent with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting
the scope of a patent through the patent prosecution process; and (4) the
doctrine was implicitly rejected as a general matter by Congress' specific





"[T]he lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents strongly supports
adherence to our refusal in Graver Tank to find that the Patent Act
conflicts with that doctrine. Congress can legislate the doctrine of
equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy
arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress,
not this Court. 72
This quote, which when combined with unanimous decisions in both cases
should probably be viewed more as a reprimand, is contained in both
Warner-Jenkinson and Festo and clearly indicates the Supreme Court's
reluctance to disturb the delicate balance that exists in patent law." In fact,
Justice Ginsberg, in her concurring opinion in Warner-Jenkinson,
expressed concern about disturbing the balance when she discussed the
ramifications of a strict rebuttable presumption standard.74 It is this concern
that convinced and will continue to convince the Court not to make drastic
changes to the patent system that will have far-reaching economic effects.
72 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1838 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)).
71 See id. at 1841. The court, recognizing the effects that such a change would
make stated:
The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson, which
instructed that courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the
settled expectations of the inventing community. In that case we made it clear
that the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel are
settled law.
Id. (citations omitted).
74 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice
Ginsburg states in part:
I join the opinion of the Court and write separately to add a cautionary
note on the rebuttable presumption the Court announces regarding
prosecution history estoppel. I address in particular the application of the
presumption in this case and others in which patent prosecution has already
been completed. The new presumption, if applied woodenly, might in some
instances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice
at the time of patent prosecution that such a presumption would apply. Such
a patentee would have had little incentive to insist that the reasons for all
modifications be memorialized in the file wrapper as they were made. Years
after the fact, the patentee may find it difficult to establish an evidentiary
basis that would overcome the new presumption. The Court's opinion is
sensitive to this problem, noting that "the PTO may have relied upon a




FESTO TO THE RESCUE?
A. The Scope of Prosecution History Estoppel
The first major issue addressed by the Court was the scope and
application of prosecution history estoppel." Festo, as the patent owner and
petitioner, argued that only narrowing amendments concerning the subject
matter of a patent should be vulnerable to prosecution history estoppel.76
Although the Court appeared to side with the Federal Court of Appeals on
this issue, close inspection of the holding indicates that the scope of
prosecution history estoppel remains as it was declared in Warner-
Jenkinson. In the instant case, and perhaps in an effort to offset the
aggressive stance taken by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner argued for
restricting application of prosecution history estoppel to limiting amend-
ments made in order to avoid prior art." The Court suggested that this
restriction was not warranted and indicated that prosecution history
estoppel may apply to other amendments.7" They reasoned that superficial
amendments would be treated as such, if in fact they were superficial, and
if an amendment was deemed to have narrowed the scope of the patent,
"estoppel may apply."79
The description of the scope of prosecution history estoppel by the
Court in Festo meshes neatly with the description given in Warner-
Jenkinson. In that case, the Court acknowledged that there are situations
where prosecution history estoppel clearly should be considered: when
limiting amendments are made "to avoid prior art, or [ ] to address a
specific concern.., that arguably would have rendered the claimed subject
matter unpatentable."° The Court then introduced a rebuttable presumption
of estoppel for amendments that limited claims but that were not
explained."1 In Festo, the Court combined those theories, stating that
estoppel may apply either for limiting changes that avoid prior art or for
limiting changes made to comply with § 112 of the Patent Act.8 2 The
strategic choice of the word "may" is merely an indication by the Court
that the patentee then must prove that the subject matter at issue was not
relinquished. 3 In other words, the patentee must overcome a rebuttable
presumption.
15 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1839.76 Id.
77 Id.
78 id.
791 Id. at 1840.
80 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-31.
81 See id. at 33-41.




B. The Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents
The choice of the Word "may" in the discussion of the scope of
prosecution history estoppel was telling in another way. It indicated that the
Court would not accept the absolute bar that the Court of Appeals wished
to apply to elements that were amended during prosecution. As indicated
in Warner-Jenkinson, the Court recognized that the time for determining
equivalents is at the time of infringement.' 4 The Court in fact offered that
there are situations in which an amendment clearly does not relinquish
territory limited in an amended claim, such as unforseeable equivalents or
equivalents that have a "tangential" relationship. 5 The Court also left room
open for other alternatives. The Court of Appeals, however, wished to hold
a patentee to the literal terms used in a claim, even those that may have
been arbitrarily limited. The Court disagreed, stating that an amended claim
may suffer the same imperfections of word choice as an original claim.
6
The anomaly created by the Court of Appeals' rule would be devastating
to the patent process. The Supreme Court, recognizing this, strongly
admonished the lower court:
The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson,
which instructed that courts must be cautious before adopting changes
that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community. In that
case we made it clear that the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of
prosecution history estoppel are settled law. The responsibility for
changing them rests with Congress. Fundamental alterations in these rules
risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.
8 7
Fearing inequity, the Court, as they had done some five years earlier,
reaffirmed its position of a rebuttable presumption of prosecution history
estoppel for limiting amendments made during the patent application
process and confirmed that prosecution history estoppel does not act as an
absolute bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents.88 However, once
again the door was left open for legislative action. 9 Although it seems
certain that the Supreme Court will not change its position in the near
84 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
85 Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1842.
16 Id. at 1840-41.
87 Id. at 1841 (citations omitted)'(emphasis added).
88 See id. at 1841-42.
89 See supra notes 72, 87.
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future, they have made it clear that Congress has and may use its power to
do so. Thus, attention must be paid to the effects and consequences of the
Court of Appeals' position on the future of patent prosecution and the
economic effects it would have on the value of patent portfolios. If
Congress sees fit to make such a change-a change which would effec-
tively remove rights from a patent holder--opponents should be prepared
to lobby for increased protection in order to maintain the patent law
balance.
IV. EFFECTS OF AN ABSOLUTE BAR
Although the Supreme Court has unanimously expressed its disap-
proval of a complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents twice, the Court has
also indicated that Congress would be the better audience for such an
effort.90 The arguments in favor of such a bar would not differ from those
forwarded in Warner-Jenkinson and Festo, and they would be centered on
the presumed stability that such a bar would provide.91
In order to promote innovation, patent law provides both a means for
protection and a source of information.92 The system provides the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention, while at the
same time it publishes in great detail the elements of that invention.93
Access to the patent descriptions and explanations is then granted to the
public. Innovation is promoted by allowing others to improve or build upon
the concepts contained within them. A necessary result, however, is that the
system also allows for circumvention. By detailing the claimed territory of
the invention, the patentee explicitly describes the "metes and bounds" of
the area of property to which he is claiming title.94 The argument that
proponents of the absolute-bar theory present is that these property
delineations must be clear enough so that other inventors are properly
informed with regard to what is and what is not claimed by the inventor.95
90 See supra notes 72, 87.
" See generally Transcript from Oral Arguments before Supreme Court, Festo
Corp. v. Skoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., at 40-47 (Jan. 8, 2002), at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/30jan2002l630/www.supremecourtus.
gov/oraLarguments/argumentranscripts/00- 1543.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
92 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 2, 3.
9" See supra note 17.
95 See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122




If these delineations are not clear, the argument continues, there is too
much risk for the other inventor to bear and innovation suffers as a result.96
The Federal Court of Appeals' theory thus argues that allowing prosecution
history estoppel to act as an absolute bar to the application of the doctrine
of equivalents would provide clarity.
Opponents of the absolute bar, however, focus on the admission that
patents are an imperfect representation of an innovative device or process.97
This imperfection is born from the necessary result of using written
language to describe conceptions. While it is true that permitting prosecu-
tion history estoppel to act as an absolute bar to the application of the
doctrine of equivalents would make the property boundaries more clear to
an inventor reviewing the patent, the effects on the patent owner are drastic.
A current patent has a twenty year life,"8 and may be attacked or defended
at any time during this period. Any changes to the law regarding the extent
to which the patent may be protected have a direct effect on the value of the
patent.99 Also, as Justice Ginsberg worried, the expectations of the patentee
would be reduced.100
To underscore this point, consider the following simple example that
is largely based on one proffered during oral arguments in Festo.'0 ' The
example proceeds as follows: In situation #1, a patentee changes a claim
from the word "adhesives" to a more limiting word, perhaps "glue," in
response to any action from the PTO regarding some other concern with the
96 See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). The court described the claims from the prospective of a potential
competitor:
Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the patent
system works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the
useful arts, its constitutional purpose. Inherent in our claim-based patent
system is also the principle that the protected invention is what the claims
say it is, and thus that infringement can be avoided by avoiding the language
of the claims.
Id.
97 See HARMON, supra note 15, at 332-33 (describing a patent as "one of the
most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy").
98 See supra note 14.
99 See supra note 10.
1oo See supra note 74.
1o1 See Transcript from Oral Arguments before Supreme Court, Festo Corp. v.
Skoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., at 34,35 (Jan. 8,2002), at http://a257.g.
akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/30jan20021630/www.supremecourtus.gov/oraLargu
ments/argumentranscripts/00-1543.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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patent. In situation #2, the patentee chooses the word "glue" from the
outset and thus never amends the claim. Under the Federal Court of
Appeals' rule, although the resulting patents would have the same specific
wording, the patentee in situation #1 would not be permitted to invoke the
doctrine of equivalents with regard to that element, whereas the patentee in
situation #2 would be free to use the doctrine. The result is much more
equitable under the Warner-Jenkinson/Festo standard. The patentee in
situation #1 would be presumed to have given up the right to claim an
equivalent of "glue" and would then have the burden to overcome the
presumption, perhaps with an assertion that the equivalent was unfor-
seeable at the time of the application. The two situations also highlight the
differences in economic value that would be placed on the patent in
situation #1 versus that in situation #2.
Likewise, the practical effect of the Federal Court of Appeals' decision
was felt as soon as it was handed down-evidenced by the fact that it
immediately overruled at least eight Federal Circuit rulings." 2 In the
dissenting opinions, the ominous scope of the decision was noted, and the
majority's opinion was labeled as "drastic," "unjust," and termed "a
profound inequity." ' 3 The subsequent decisions of several federal courts
also contained indications of disapproval. 4 Nevertheless, if Congress is
102 TM Patents v. IBM, 136 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
103 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 629,
631, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Circuit Judge Linn describes the majority's decision
with regard to prosecution history estoppel as follows:
I see no substantial cause for the majority's drastic action, and I must,
respectfully, dissent from the pronouncement that any time a claim
limitation is narrowed by amendment for any statutory purpose, regardless
of the nature and extent of the change, prosecution history estoppel
completely bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Id. at 629 (Lina, J., dissenting). Likewise, Circuit Judge Newman has the following
to say with regard to the decision: "The majority recasts prosecution history
estoppel in a legally incorrect and equitably unjust manner." Id. at 631 (Newman,
J., dissenting). Judge Newman adds:
In addition, a profound inequity is now created between those patents
that may fortuitously have managed to avoid amendment or argument as to
all elements subject to imitation by insubstantial change, and those that have
not. The practical significance has not been explored in the majority
opinion, and indeed this aspect was not briefed or argued.
Id. at 638.
104For example, in TMPatents, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 209, a case that was decided
almost two months after the Federal Circuit's November 2000 ruling, it appears
that Judge McMahon does not agree with the higher court's decision. Throughout
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convinced that the benefits of claim clarity outweigh these inequities,
proponentt of patentee's rights should be prepared to react.
One obvious reaction would be to avoid prosecution history estoppel
altogether by refusing to limit claims or by using various claims configura-
tions that could not be viewed as limiting. The necessary consequences of
this would be an increase in appeals and increased and longer correspon-
dences between the patentee and the PTO."0 5 This would certainly delay the
date of issuance for a patent, (and would actually result in less timely
information for the public) because patents as a whole would not issue as
quickly as they do under the current system. Another possible consequence,
especially with regard to manufacturing processes, would be that compa-
nies would turn to trade secret protection. Trade secret law originated from
common law and is now state-based law.1"6 Trade secrets protect products
or processes from use by others by creating a veil of secrecy around the
product or process.0 7 Although in theory trade secret protection could last
in perpetuity, not all products or processes are best for trade secret
protection and, if the invention is susceptible to discovery independently
or by reverse engineering, protection would end at that point. 108 An inventor
whose product or process could be protected by either patent or trade secret
protection'09 typically weighs the benefits and risks of both systems.
Therefore, if Congress were to follow the Federal Court of Appeals'
approach to prosecution history estoppel, thus diminishing the value of a
patent and its marketability for licensing, more inventors might choose to
keep their product or process secret. This would thereby risk independent
development. Ironically, this would work to defeat the purpose that the
Federal Court of Appeals had in suggesting the change, namely an increase
in useful information. An alternative that does not have such a result should
be sought.
the case, Judge McMachon drops subtle hints to this effect, continually stating that
he is "bound to follow," the ruling, that the court made a "cataclysmic" decision,
and that he was "constrained to conclude," as he did. Id. at 211, 214, 215.
105 See Bruce D. Sunstein, Drafting Patent Applications after Festo and
Johnson & Johnston, at http://www.bromsun.com/pub/professional/Festo.pdf(last
visited Mar. 28, 2003).
1o See HARMON, supra note 15, at 712.
107 See, e.g., CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985).
108 Id. Trade Secret law is an interesting area of intellectual property law and a
topic that warrants many pages of discussion, however for the purposes of this
Note, it is only briefly discussed as an alternative to seeking a patent.
09 The author notes that not all products or processes fall into both categories.
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V. THE "RESERVE-LIMIT" DESIGNATION 1 ° .
Assuming, arguendo, that Congress were to entertain such a limitation
on the application of the doctrine of equivalents, how could the rights of a
potential patentee be bolstered in order to even the property rights versus
public access balance? This Note proposes that a new designation be
introduced, as an alternative, that would be captured during the prosecution
process and noted in the prosecution history. However, the reasoning
behind the limitation would not become part of the history. The designation
would work as follows: a patentee would be allowed the right to limit an
amendment, while reserving the right to disclose the reason for the
limitation if an infringement suit were to arise in the future. If an element
had this reserve-limit designation, the absolute bar would not apply. This
reserve-limit designation, of course, would not apply to limitations that
were specifically requested by the PTO, and thus would not tie the Office's
hands during the patent process. However, in situations such as those
encountered in Warner-Jenkinson and Festo, where the patentee made a
limitation that was not in direct response to the PTO, the reserve-limit
designation would afford the patent owners the ability to subsequently
argue to the court the reasons for these limitations. In the case of Warner-
Jenkinson, it would have allowed the patentee the right to introduce
evidence that testing had been done at pH levels well below the 6.0
limitation placed in the patent."' By including reserve-limit designations
in the prosecution record, a potential infringer would at least be on notice
that the purported limitation may not be rigid. A potential infringer would
also be on notice that those limitations that do not have a reserve-limit
designation are strict boundaries.
The question then arises as to why a patentee would not just place a
reserve-limit designation on all limits contained within the patent. First, as
"0 This suggested addition to the patent prosecution process was developed by
the author and is intended as a preemptive suggestion should Congress decide to
entertain the arguments set forth by the Federal Circuit's approach.
.. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 22 n.2
(1997). This footnote reads:
Petitioner contends that the lower limit was added because below a pH of
6.0 the patented process created "foaming" problems in the plant and
because the process was not shown to work below that pH level. Respon-
dent counters that the process was successfully tested to pH levels as low
as 2.2 with no effect on the process because of foaming, but offers no




noted, if the limitation were in direct response to a specific concern of the
PTO, this designation would not be available. Thus in such a situation there
would be no difference from the current procedure. The difference arises
when a limitation is added that was not in direct response to the PTO. The
patentee at this point must document the reason for the limitation, but this
information does not become part of the prosecution history-only the
designation that certain elements are reserve-limited. The documented
reasoning would then come into play if an infringement suit were to arise
at a later point in time. If an inventor fails to document the reason for the
limitation, he would then be barred from subsequently arguing the reasons
during an infringement suit. If, however, the inventor did document the
reasoning for the limitation, then this information could be introduced
during the infringement trial.
This proposed system would provide more information for the public
without forcing the patentee to give up rights unnecessarily. If a potential
infringer decided to chance an infringement suit by altering an element that
was designated as reserve-limited, then the potential infringer would chance
that the reason for the limitation would eclipse the elements of the
potentially infringing device. On the other hand, if a change were made in
response to an action from the PTO, then no designation would be attached
to the element and the potentially infringing device could have elements
that operated outside of the non-designated limitations. To illustrate,
reconsider the adhesives/glue paradox.1 2 As noted, under the Federal Court
of Appeals approach, even though the resulting patents would be identical
(i.e., both resulting patents include the word "glue"), protection from
infringement would differ because only the patentee in situation #1 would
be permitted to utilize the doctrine of equivalents. Under the proposed
modification, if the change from the adhesives to glue wording was made
for a reason that was not in direct response to a concern from the PTO, the
patentee could then use the reserve-limit designation and maintain
documentation giving the reasons for the limitation. Under this scenario,
both patentees would ultimately be permitted to use the doctrine of
equivalents to challenge a potentially infringing device.
To further understand the different effects that the Federal Court of
Appeals' approach and this new approach would have on the patent
process, another simple example may be helpful. Consider an inventor who
invents a new process for a chemical composition that may be used to treat
1 2 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 91
FESTO TO THE RESCUE?
the exterior of a structure in commercial building applications.' 3 Assume
a critical element of this process is dependent upon heating a solution to a
temperature of 4002 F for a period of time, although testing has shown that
the composition will work, perhaps not as well, by heating the solution to
a minimum temperature of 2002 F or a maximum temperature of 6002 F.
Assume another key element later in the process includes the use of a
certain portion of alcohol in the solution and both acetyl-alcohol and ethyl-
alcohol were tested with similar results.
In order to protect the invention, assume the inventor is considering
trade secret protection or, as an alternative, patent protection. Under trade
secret protection, the inventor must consider the ability to keep the secret
in fact secret, with the risk that a competitor might develop the process
independently. If it was an independent discovery, the inventor would have
no recourse against his or her competitor. Under patent protection,
however, the optimal situation would result in complete protection of the
process.
Assume that the inventor chooses the patent route and proceeds to
apply for a patent. One of the claims of the patent application contains an
explanation of the heating step, including the range of temperatures of 200O
F to 6002 F that were possible during testing. Another claim includes the
use of alcohol in the mixture. During the evaluation stage, assume the PTO
notes that prior art exists with regard to the use of alcohol during the
mixing stage. Specifically, the PTO indicates that a previously existing
process includes the use of acetyl-alcohol. Accordingly, the patent
application is changed to reflect a use of ethyl-alcohol. Additionally,
because testing has recently shown that the optimal results occur at the 4002
F heating temperature, the patent application is also changed to reflect the
heating temperature of 400° F. The patent application then follows the
process and is eventually issued. Under the Federal Court of Appeals'
approach (and the current approach), both limitations become part of the
prosecution history and are available to anyone who desires to reach the
information. 114
13 See generally Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24 (discussing the facts of
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)). This
example was inspired by the Warner-Jenkinson case, and while it may be overly
simplified, it does represent what could be a real concern for inventors as
evidenced by the actual facts of Warner-Jenkinson. Note that the particulars of the
example are entirely hypothetical and are merely meant to serve as factual grounds
for the purpose of the example.
114 See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KwALL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 565 (1996).
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The patent owner, eager to capitalize on his new process, starts to
solicit companies to whom he wishes to assign the right to use the process.
Assume that, at the same time, a.competitor accesses the patent description
and the prosecution history, which are available to the public. The
competitor completes testing and develops an identical process except that
the competitor heats the solution to a temperature of5502 F. Once aware of
the competitor's similar process, the inventor sues the competitor for patent
infringement. Although the specific claims of the inventor's patent specify
that the solution is heated to 400O F, the inventor plans to use the doctrine
of equivalents to extend his protection to include the 5500 F temperature
that the competitor is using. Likewise, the competitor plans to use
prosecution history estoppel to bar the inventor's infringement claim.
Now, consider the two approaches. Under the Federal Court of
Appeals' approach, the inventor would be absolutely barred from claiming
an equivalent of 550 F. Although the PTO had expressed concern about
the alcohol designation, the inventor had limited the temperature claim to
reflect his optimal tests. Even though the limitation was not in response to
a concern of the PTO, under this approach the inventor is nevertheless
barred from using the doctrine of equivalents. The detrimental effect of this
approach on the value of the patent is clear.
Under the proposed approach, at the time that the inventor decided to
limit the temperature range to 400o F, he could have made a reserve-limit
designation with regard to this element. The prosecution history still
contains the limit to ethyl-alcohol, but now indicates that the 400 - F
temperature is reserve-limited. Included in the patent holder's records (but
not part of the prosecution history and thus not available to the public) is
the evidence of the tests that showed success at ranges from 2002 F to 6002
F. Now, admittedly, the decision for the competitor is more difficult
because the exact bounds of the claimed territory are not as clearly
delineated as under the Federal Court of Appeals' approach. However, the
reserve-limit approach provides the competitor with more information than
is currently available while stopping short of giving him the keys to
circumventing the patent's claims. With regard to the alcohol limitation,
where the inventor was precluded from including a reserve-limit designa-
tion, the competitor has more information than previously available because
this element will not be subject to the doctrine of equivalents. With regard
to the heating temperature, the competitor is also given more information
* than currently available because he is on notice that this element has been
limited and that the inventor claims to possess documentation as to why this
limitation was made. This could possibly mean that the inventor may claim
other temperatures in future litigation.
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Note that the reserve-limit designation does not inequitably act to
protect the inventor. To demonstrate, consider the result if the competitor
had found success with a temperature of 650L F. Under the current system,
the inventor may be able to claim the doctrine of equivalents in order to
cover this temperature. Under the Federal Court of Appeals' approach, the
inventor would be precluded from invoking the doctrine of equivalents.
Under the proposed approach, the records of the inventor (showing success
only in the temperature ranges of 2 00o F to 600 F) would actually work
against his attempt to cover the 650 ° F process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of patent protection can be traced back to authority
contained in the United States Constitution. Necessary to this protection is
the use of the doctrine of equivalents, and a necessary limitation to the use
of the doctrine of equivalents is prosecution history estoppel. The value that
an issued patent possesses can only be determined by understanding the
sound principles that courts will apply in order to protect a patent owner.
In its 2002 Festo decision, the Supreme Court restated its position that the
doctrine of equivalents shall survive. The Court also rejected the Court of
Appeals' holding that prosecution history estoppel will operate as an
absolute bar against any use of the doctrine of equivalents for any element
that was limited for any reason. The Court reaffirmed the position taken in
Warner-Jenkinson: that amendments that limit elements create a rebuttable
presumption that prosecution history estoppel applies. Both in Festo and in
Warner-Jenkinson, the Court indicated that Congress could legislate this
issue if it pleased.
Although it appears from the Court's two unanimous decisions that
they will not allow such a change to affect the balance of patent protection,
the door has been left open for Congressional action. If Congress were to
decide to disturb the balance in this way, potential patentees could
alternatively re-evaluate the use and value of the patent system, perhaps
turning the patent prosecution process into a never-ending trail of appeals
and amended claims, or turn to alternative means of protection. On the
other hand, potential patentees could attempt to restore the balance by
lobbying for further changes to the patent prosecution process.
One solution could be the addition of a new designation for claim
elements that were limited for reasons other than direct requests from the
PTO, termed reserve-limit claims. The reserve-limit designation would
become part of the prosecution history, but the reasons for the limitations
would be maintained by the patentee and not included in the prosecution
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history of the patent. A potential infringer would then be on notice as to
which claims are truly limited, and as to those that may not be. More
importantly, the rights of the patent holder, the potential value of a patent,
and the balance of patent protection would be restored.
